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Abstract
The article examines three trends that have charac-
terised the development of defence clusters: firstly, 
the defence budget cuts up till 2015 have been a 
driving factor for maintaining capabilities together 
with other countries. Secondly, more permanent 
formats have been created, aiming at more struc-
tural and longer-term cooperation. Thirdly, defence 
cooperation has been deepened, both in opera-
tional terms but also in maintenance, logistics and 
for the acquisition of the same equipment. The new 
EU defence initiatives, such as Permanent Struc-
tured Cooperation could offer a framework for 
defence clusters, but it is considered that European 
countries will be rather selective in using those 
instruments in the face of existing multinational 
cooperation formats. The success of these coopera-
tive initiatives depend substantially from political 
trust and solidarity that shape how contributions 
translate into defence performance. It concludes 
that specialised clusters are not about creating a 
European Army, but rather about building Euro-
pean armies step-by-step, needed for a better trans-
atlantic burden-sharing and to underpin Europe’s 
responsibility to take care of its own security and 
defence.
Resumo
Clusters: os Vetores Dinamizadores da Defesa 
Europeia
O artigo examina o desenvolvimento destas modalidades 
de cooperação em três vertentes. Em primeiro à luz do 
impacto dos cortes orçamentais no quadro da defesa 
europeia até 2015. Em segundo, o desenvolvimento 
recente de novos formatos mais permanentes, destinados 
a uma cooperação mais estruturante e de longa duração. 
Em terceiro, no enquadramento dado pelo aprofunda-
mento da cooperação no domínio da defesa no plano ope-
racional, mas também da manutenção, da logística e da 
aquisição de equipamentos de defesa. Examina ainda a 
forma como a Cooperação Estruturada Permanente pode 
oferecer uma oportunidade para o desenvolvimento de 
clusters de defesa, pese embora o empenho seletivo dos 
países europeus, atendendo à existência de outros forma-
tos de cooperação multinacional. O sucesso destas inicia-
tivas cooperativas depende consideravelmente da pre-
sença de confiança politica e solidariedade entre os 
Estados Membros, que permita a transformação de con-
tributos em desempenhos concretos no plano da defesa. 
Conclui que os clusters especializados refletem a reali-
dade, não se destinando à criação de um exército euro-
peu, mas antes à construção de exércitos europeus de 
uma forma gradual, necessários a uma partilha mais efi-
caz da responsabilidade transatlântica e que reflita a 
intenção europeia de assumir a direção da sua segurança 
e defesa.
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Introduction
Defence is a complicated business. It involves a wide set of actors: politicians, policy 
makers, military staff, parliaments, research and technology institutions and 
industry – just to mention the most important ones. International defence coopera-
tion is even more complex. Firstly, there are now at least three multinational orga- 
nisations dealing with defence: NATO, the European Union and, for blue helmet 
operations, the United Nations. Their roles and tasks are different, but at the same 
time an overlap exists, in particular between the EU and NATO. For example, both 
organisations are involved in stability operations and capacity-building. For mili-
tary operations at the high end of the spectrum often ad hoc coalitions of the willing 
are established. The most recent example is the anti-ISIS coalition under the leader-
ship of the United States, carrying out the air campaign over Iraq and Syria. 
Secondly, nations cooperate quite extensively in smaller bilateral or subregional 
defence cooperation formats – also referred to as defence clusters. Originally, 
cooperation in such clusters was focused on operational matters: creating common 
headquarters, combining military education and training as well as bringing mili-
tary units together in binational or multinational formations. In recent years, 
defence clusters have also become important vehicles for deepening cooperation 
through the integration of staff and units, through common defence planning and 
through the acquisition of the same equipment. The list of clusters and their activi-
ties has grown considerably.
This article is specifically dedicated to defence clusters. First, the author will look at 
recent developments. What is new in defence clusters; what makes them different 
compared to their predecessors? Next, the various types of cluster cooperation will 
be categorised and assessed, based on success and failure factors. Concrete exam-
ples will be listed to underscore these factors. In the following section the author 
will analyse how and why clusters develop in a specialised manner. The article 
ends with some conclusions. 
Clusters: What’s New?
There is nothing new in combined operations by the armed forces of various 
nations. In 1815 the Duke of Wellington led a coalition of forces consisting of British, 
Irish, Belgian, Dutch, Polish and Prussian soldiers – alongside military from 
Hannover, Brunswick and other entities. Both in World War I and World War II 
Allied Forces combined their efforts, bringing American, Canadian, British, French 
and the military of many other nations together under one overall command. In all 
those cases multinational formations were of a temporary nature. Normally, troops 
would return to their national territory after the fighting had ended in order to 
carry out their defence tasks in their home country. With the creation of NATO this 
century-old practice changed. Permanent structures were established for political 
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steering and control – the North Atlantic Council – and for commanding Allied 
forces: the NATO command structure. In the course of the Cold War ‘multina- 
tionalisation’ in education, training and exercises for NATO’s core Article 5 task of 
territorial defence became the norm. Even permanent multinational formations 
were created, such as the fully integrated AWACS fleet, the ACE Mobile Force and 
the standing naval groups to which Member States contribute on a rotating basis. 
The end of the Cold War brought a new task for NATO: non-Article 5 or out-of-area 
crisis management operations. The armed forces of NATO (and several non-NATO) 
countries started to operate together in real-life missions, in the Balkans in the 1990s 
and in Afghanistan and Iraq today. As defence was no longer ‘static’ – i.e. limited to 
defending NATO’s territory – ‘deployability’ over long distances became a priority. 
It resulted in the creation of a number of deployable forces headquarters (HQ), such 
as the 1st German-Netherlands Corps HQ, the Eurocorps HQ and several others – 
although political factors also often played a role in launching such initiatives. 
Real-life multinational operations in the air, at sea and on land also led to new 
permanent military formations. The Franco-German Brigade and the European 
Participating Air Forces (Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands) are early 
examples of post-Cold War defence clusters. 
While NATO continued to adapt to the rapidly changing security environment – 
such as by the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and, in 2014, its spear-
head the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) – European nations also 
started to cooperate militarily in the European Union as of the turn of the century. 
Firstly, in EU crisis management operations, albeit they turned out to be relatively 
small in scale and not in the high end of the spectrum. Secondly, EU Battlegroups 
– small battalion-plus sized formations for crisis management – were created as 
stand-by forces. Although so far they have never been deployed in real-life opera-
tions, the EU Battlegroups became important vehicles for closer operational 
cooperation between various groups of European countries. Outside the EU four 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands) established the European 
Air Transport Command (EATC) in 2010, the first example of the permanent 
transfer of command to a multinational European level. Three other nations (Italy, 
Luxembourg and Spain) have joined the EATC, which commands around 60 
percent of all of Europe’s military air transport assets. Estimated savings for the 
contributing nations are around 15 percent. EATC has proven that permanent inte-
gration through a multinational command structure is perfectly possible. Its busi-
ness model has optimised the cost-effective use of air transport, air-to-air refueling 
and the aeromedical evacuation capabilities of the participating countries.
In recent years, defence clusters have further expanded, both in quantitative and in 
qualitative terms. New clusters have been created, e.g. the structural Franco-British 
security and defence cooperation under the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties. Others 
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have been ‘upgraded’ to a higher level of cooperation or used as a vehicle for inte-
grating armed forces, such as of certain units of the German and Dutch land forces. 
Three factors have influenced or characterised the development of defence clusters 
in the last decade.
First, the defence budget cuts as a driving force: as a consequence of the economic-
financial crisis European defence expenditure dropped by seven percent from 2007 
to 20131. In some countries the percentage was much higher. Often investment 
programmes had to delayed or cancelled. In many cases the planned acquisition 
numbers of new frigates, aircraft and armoured vehicles were corrected down-
wards. In others cases capabilities were completely lost. In 2010 the United Kingdom 
scrapped the acquisition programme of the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft. 
In the same year the Netherlands deactivated its last two tank battalions, while 
heavy artillery had already been reduced to eighteen modern self-propelled 155 
mm howitzers (PH2000). Influenced by the same financial austerity, the acquisition 
budget for the replacement of the Dutch F16 fighter aircraft was fixed at €4.5 billion 
(the 2013 price level), which allowed for the procurement of 37 F35s (Joint Strike 
Fighters). To optimise the availability of fighter aircraft for international missions 
the Dutch authorities agreed with Belgium on common air policing and renegade 
flights over Benelux territory. As of January 2017 one of the two countries has two 
fighter aircraft available for air policing/renegade flights in Benelux airspace on a 
24/7 basis. The period was initially four months, but was extended to eight months 
to coincide with the Belgian and Dutch contribution to the anti-ISIS air campaign. 
The common air policing/renegade agreement allows for such overseas deploy-
ment to be continued. Under the Lancaster House Treaties, France and the United 
Kingdom have reduced their nuclear weapons test facilities, making use of joint 
centres on both sides of the Channel. These are examples of maintaining capabili-
ties through mutual dependencies.
Second, more permanent forms of cooperation: there are older examples of perma-
nent defence cooperation formats, such as Benesam – the Belgian-Netherlands 
naval cooperation. It dates back to the 1950s, was given a boost in the 1990s and is 
characterised by integration elements2. In 2013 the Defence Ministers of Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed a Benelux Declaration on defence 
cooperation. It formed the basis for more extensive cooperation in a wider struc-
1 EU Member States – minus Denmark – together spent €204 billion on defence in 2007. In 2013 
the total amount had dropped to €190 billion. Nominally total European defence expenditure 
dropped by 7 percent. In real value (taking inflation into account) the percentage is 10 percent 
(EDA, 2016, 2017). 
2 See the third factor that have influenced or characterised the development of defence clusters 
in the last decade.
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ture, from the level of Defence Ministers to the military experts level and encom-
passing naval, air, land and supporting forces. The first concrete projects – ‘reaping 
low hanging fruit’ – were mainly in the education and training area. For example, 
it was agreed to keep one paratrooper school in Belgium, also used for training the 
Dutch military. Others, such as the Benelux air policing/renegade arrangement, 
took more time – in particular because national legislation had to be adapted. The 
Lancaster House security and defence cooperation is also permanent. It encom-
passes operational elements – in particular the Franco-British Combined Joint 
Expeditionary Force – as well as binational technology investment, armaments 
procurement programmes and defence industrial cooperation. Although some 
projects were dropped over time, there are ongoing binational development and 
procurement programmes such as for missiles and future air combat systems, 
including an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). The Scandinavian countries 
work structurally together in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), 
although this format is perhaps too large to be effective. German-Netherlands 
defence cooperation was brought to a permanent level by the land forces of the two 
countries3, but by now has expanded to the air defence and naval areas. 
Third, the deepening of defence cooperation: in line with the previous factors, 
countries are deepening their defence cooperation in clusters. Firstly, it applies to 
operational formats. In the past, integration below battalion level was considered to 
be something of a taboo. It simply could not work, due to different languages, 
organisation and culture – so the argument went. Germany and the Netherlands 
have broken this taboo by integrating a tank company with Dutch personnel into 
the German 414th Tank Battalion. By operating the same Leopard 2 tanks, by 
speaking German and by using the same doctrine and procedures, this binational 
tank battalion has proven in tests and exercises to comply fully with the required 
standards. The integration extends further upwards: the 414th Tank Battalion is 
under the command of the Netherlands 43th Mechanised Brigade, which is a subor-
dinate unit of the 1st German Armoured Division. One could argue that such far-
reaching integration is born out of necessity. Indeed, the format was designed in 
order to maintain knowledge and experience in operating tanks in the Dutch 
Army4. But the example also shows that there is more scope for such integration 
models, naturally assuming that preconditions apply as stated above. German-
Dutch defence cooperation has also grown in the areas of air mobile forces, air 
defence and amphibious forces. There is a clear practical pay-off: both for NATO 
territorial defence as well as for deployed operations in countries like Afghanistan 
3 Ibid.
4 See Swillens (2018). 
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and Mali the armed forces of the two countries operate together or rotate their units 
almost as if it were a purely national contribution. 
Naturally, this has consequences for political decision-making: in both coun- 
tries Parliaments are involved in this process. Thus, deeper operational defence 
cooperation can require the synchronisation of political decision-making proces- 
ses. Integrating forces also opens up the potential for rationalising training and 
maintenance. The Dutch and Belgian Navies operate the same M-frigates and 
minehunters. There is only one school for training personnel to operate M-frigates 
(in Den Helder, the Netherlands) and one school for minehunter training (in 
Oostende, Belgium). The maintenance of all M-frigates takes place in the Nether-
lands while all minehunters are maintained in Belgium. Both countries have 
recently synchronised their procurement plans in order to purchase the same 
successor ships in the 2020s. Belgium leads the minehunter replacement programme 
and the Netherlands the acquisition programme for new frigates. As operating the 
same equipment is an absolute prerequisite for military integration, it is clear that 
defence technological and industrial interests have to be aligned too. This is visible 
in the Franco-German defence cooperation, such as the future tank/armoured 
vehicles programme – mirrored by defence industrial cooperation between Kraus 
Maffei Wegmann and Nexter – or the development of a future fighter aircraft (with 
Dassault and Airbus Defence being involved). 
In the meantime a whole set of new defence cooperation initiatives has been 
launched in the EU. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is meant 
to monitor Member States’ defence efforts and to explore the potential for common 
programmes, in particular in R&T and procurement. In 2017, a pilot CARD exercise 
was conducted. The first fully-fledged CARD report will be produced in the autumn 
of 2018. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched at the end of 
2017. It is based on the EU Treaties and thus provides a juridical basis for defence 
cooperation among a group of 25 Member States. The PESCO countries have 
committed themselves to implementing a set of criteria (benchmarks or targets) on 
European defence cooperation such as spending norms and the obligation to parti- 
cipate in collaborative procurement programmes. Furthermore, groups of PESCO 
participating Member States have initiated projects with a variable composition. 
Some projects are operationally oriented; others focus on procurement. Finally, the 
European Commission is the new kid on the block with regard to defence coopera-
tion. The Juncker Commission has embraced defence as a priority area. It has 
launched the European Defence Fund. It is already up and running with pilot 
activities for defence research and industrial cooperation. After 2020 the Commis-
sion aims to invest €13 billion in both areas in the context of the Multi-annual 
Financial Framework 2021-2027. Member States and defence industries can profit 
from the financial assistance from the EU budget, but obviously the Commission 
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will only grant the funds in the case of industrial development projects if these are 
multinational, involve a minimum of two Member States and companies located in 
at least three countries. 
One could argue that the new EU instruments, in particular PESCO, offer a frame-
work for defence clusters. For R&T and procurement programmes financial bene-
fits are offered by the EDF, while CARD could be used as a tool for increasing 
synchronisation or even combining defence planning. The question is: are Euro-
pean countries inclined to transfer their binational or subregional cooperation to 
the EU level – which will be seen, justified or not, as losing control and increasing 
bureaucracy. Cooperation formats with the UK face an additional problem: Brexit 
makes it more difficult to cooperate on defence matters with London in the EU 
context. The likely outcome is a mixed bag. Some cooperation programmes might 
be introduced in PESCO and might attract EDF money. Others will remain outside 
the EU structures for political or other reasons. 
Types of Clusters 
Clusters exist in many formats or types. Firstly, a distinction can be made between 
operational clusters (military formations) and defence-equipment clusters (procure-
ment clusters). The latter will not be extensively described and analysed in this 
article. However, it is important to note that collaborative procurement programmes 
are not only dependent on multinational military cooperation but also on techno-
logical and industrial work shares. The latter brings in a non-military element, 
which is driven by other interests than strictly those of the Defence Ministries and 
the armed forces. Past experience in multinational procurement programmes shows 
that national socio-economic interests – such as maintaining production lines, jobs 
and knowledge – have often been decisive factors of influence, leading to rising 
costs and delays in the programmes. The A400M transport aircraft with an esti-
mated extra cost of €11 billion may serve as an example.
With regard to operational clusters at least five different types exist5:
(1) Multinational deployable headquarters: HQ formations able to plan and 
conduct up to corps-sized operations with a permanently integrated multi- 
national staff. Examples are: the 1st German-Netherlands Corps (located in 
Münster, Germany) with the representation of twelve nations; the Eurocorps 
(Strasbourg, France), with five participating nations; the Multinational Corps 
Northeast (Szczecin, Poland) established by three framework nations (Denmark, 
Germany, Poland). All three HQs have been deployed to Afghanistan to lead 
5 This categorisation is based on Zandee, Drent and Hendriks (2016). The success and failure 
factors in this article also originate from this Clingendael Report.
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NATO’s ISAF operation. Integrated HQs also exist below the corps level, e.g. 
the Multinational Division North East HQ in Elblag, Poland.
(2) Modular operational formations: permanent multinational formations with an 
integrated multinational staff, but participating countries maintaining the 
option to deploy their contribution nationally or with other partners. Examples 
are: the Franco-German Brigade; the Franco-British Combined Joint Expedi-
tionary Force (CJEF), the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF); the German 
Division Schnelle Kräfte/Dutch 11 Air Mobile Brigade; the multinational Special 
Forces Command of Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
(3) Integrated operational formations: permanently integrated formations which 
can only be deployed when all partners participate. In other words: partici-
pating countries are dependent on each other. Examples are: most multinational 
deployable headquarters; NATO’s AWACS fleet; the integrated German-Neth-
erlands tank battalion6.
(4) Permanent transfer of command: a multinational formation to which partici-
pating countries have transferred command on a permanent basis, thus losing 
(partly or completely) national command authority. Examples are: European 
Air Transport Command (EATC, Eindhoven – the Netherlands); the strategic 
airlift capability (Pápa Airbase, Hungary); NATO AWACS.
(5) Role/task specialisation: countries (non-haves) being fully dependent on other 
countries to deliver capabilities to them. Examples are: Benesam education/
training and maintenance of M-frigates (by the Netherlands) and minehunters 
(by Belgium); and as a form of one-sided dependency, Baltic air policing, carried 
out by fighter aircraft from other NATO countries on a rotating basis; the same 
air policing dependency exists for Albania, Macedonia and Slovenia.
As already shown by the given examples, various types of multinational opera-
tional cooperation can overlap. The Franco-German Brigade is a combination of a 
modular and integrated operational formation. In case the Brigade is deployed in 
its entirety it is then an integrated unit. But subunits can also be deployed under 
national command. EATC has an ‘escape arrangement’ for the participating coun-
tries, which have a permanently guaranteed revocability of the transfer of authority. 
Thus, EATC could more accurately be described as ‘a conditioned permanent 
transfer of authority to a multinational level, without the loss of national sover-
eignty’. Benesam encompasses three types of cooperation: an integrated naval HQ 
(Admiral Benelux, Den Helder – the Netherlands) which also allows for national 
command chains; modularity of assets – the same ships which can operate closely 
6 The Dutch could deploy their tanks outside the integrated battalion and the Germans could 
deploy the tank battalion without the Dutch tank company, but in both cases the full combat 
potential of the integrated tank battalion would not be used.
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together but also separately; and role/task specialisation in education/training and 
maintenance.
Success and Failure Factors 
What can be learned from the experience with multinational clusters? In other 
words, what are the success or failure factors? Although no agreed list exists, the 
available literature provides common ground for the following criteria:
(1) Trust, confidence and solidarity: multinational defence cooperation is per defi-
nition more difficult than ‘doing it alone’. No country is like any other and no 
national army, navy or air force is the same as those of the partner nations. The 
negative fall-out of these national differences can only be overcome when 
partners can rely on each other, when they trust their colleagues and are confi-
dent in the delivery of their contributions and in their performance. But it 
should be underlined that trust, confidence and solidarity grow over time and 
have to be supported by practical measures and arrangements. In bilateral 
formats this is easier than in larger multinational formations. Nevertheless, in 
the Eurocorps, EATC, SAC and other formations countries ‘feel equal’ as key 
posts in those organisations rotate amongst all of them. A feeling of ‘shared 
responsibility’ (and, therefore, solidarity) is also the result of all participating 
states delivering capabilities, for example in combined or integrated units. In 
EATC the built-in guaranteed revocability of the transfer of authority and the 
options for the delegation of authority contribute to building trust and confi-
dence. Trust and confidence is also the basis of Benesam, but without the prac-
tical ‘win-win’ for both parties, the cooperation would not have gone this far.
(2) Sovereignty and autonomy: the traditional view of the limits of multinational 
defence cooperation – when national sovereignty over military means is at 
stake – no longer holds true. Several cases, in particular EATC and Benesam, 
show that countries are prepared to transfer national sovereignty or, in other 
words, they become dependent on partner(s) for a military capability. But this 
does not come easily or naturally. In Benesam, post-Cold War defence cuts 
were a driving factor for reducing the on-shore footprint to maintain maximum 
capabilities at sea. The resulting mutual dependencies of Belgium and the 
Netherlands for training personnel and the maintenance of the M-frigates and 
minehunters respectively were thus acceptable. EATC participating states 
agreed to transfer command authority on condition that it could be revoked in 
the case of national need. In the case of Baltic air policing, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania simply could not afford to operate their own fighter aircraft, with 
the consequences that as ‘have-nots’ they would per definition become depen-
dent on Allies. Deploying the integrated German-Netherlands tank battalion 
in a crisis management operation would still require sovereign national poli- 
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tical decision-making, including in Parliaments, in both countries – which 
could be a stumbling block. For that reason modularity, allowing for the with-
drawal of a country’s contribution from a multinational formation, is the 
preferred option as it offers more flexibility for real-life deployment. 
(3) Similarity of strategic cultures: it seems that countries which do not necessarily 
share the same strategic culture are still able to operate together. France, an 
experienced interventionist, and Germany, reluctant to engage in operations at 
the high end of the spectrum, have deployed their common Franco-German 
Brigade on several occasions. Although some of these deployments – such as 
in the Kabul area – were certainly not in a benign environment, it is neverthe-
less doubtful if Germany would agree to a deployment in a real fighting 
scenario, such as for example the French Operation Serval in Mali in 2013. The 
usability of a common capability such as the Franco-German Brigade can still 
have its limits due to a lack of similar strategic cultures. The same can apply to 
other multinational formations, such as the combined German Division 
Schnelle Kräfte/Dutch 11 Air Mobile Brigade. Quite understandably, the 
United Kingdom with the JEF and France/UK with the CJEF have established 
formations with the participation of like-minded countries. President Macron’s 
European Intervention Initiative should be seen in the same context.
(4) Geography and history: in general, neighbours work more easily together than 
distant friends, but geography and history have no absolute value as a success 
factor. It is true that bilateral cooperation models – Benesam, the Franco-
German Brigade and the German-Netherlands land forces’ integration – are 
proof of successful neighbouring country clusters. But in EATC or SAC several 
participants do not share borders. The same is true for multinational head-
quarters such as the Eurocorps. Apparently, if geography and history are 
obstructing multinational defence cooperation, this can be overcome in 
practice. However, for integrating combat or combat support units, geogra- 
phical proximity and a long history of working together are certainly impor-
tant success factors.
(5) Number of participants: mathematical logic would imply that multinational 
defence cooperation becomes more complicated as the number of participants 
grows. In reality, the picture is more nuanced. Certainly when it comes to 
complex and multi-functional capabilities – such as in a combat brigade or a 
tank battalion – bi-nationality is the preferred option. But for ‘enabling’ capa-
bilities, such as air transport or air-to-air refuelling commanded by EATC, 
a higher number of participating nations does not create insurmountable 
problems. The same applies to SAC. In other words, the type of cooperation 
seems to be the decisive factor for the number of participants as a success 
factor, not the number itself.
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(6) Countries and forces of similar size and quality: this factor applies in parti- 
cular to bilateral defence cooperation (as in wider groups there is often a mix 
of several bigger and smaller countries). Benesam and the Franco-German 
Brigade are cooperation formats of similarly sized countries (small-small, 
big-big). But in naval terms Benesam is not a case of two equals: the Nether-
lands Navy is larger and has a wider set of capabilities than the Belgian Navy. 
Benesam works well, despite the uneven fleets of both countries, apparently 
because other factors are more important (crucial among which are the effi-
ciency gains for both countries). The German-Netherlands land forces 
cooperation shows that even for deeper defence cooperation the combination 
of a large and a small nation can work perfectly well, but only if the larger 
nation treats the smaller nation as its ‘equal’ partner. 
(7) Top-down and bottom-up: the usual statement is that defence cooperation will 
not work without top-down political steering. This will be even more the case 
when cooperation entails a loss of sovereignty. Benesam was brought to a 
higher level of cooperation after a ministerial agreement in the 1990s. EATC 
would not have started without the involvement of Ministers of Defence. But 
it is equally true that bottom-up support is required to make defence coopera-
tion a success. The direct involvement of practitioners in Benesam to explore 
and develop deeper forms of cooperation is important for its success. Compa-
rable combinations of top-down steering and bottom-up support can also be 
found in other cases; it is nothing less than bringing politics and practice 
together which is needed in order to be successful, not only in launching but 
also in sustaining defence cooperation over time.
(8) Mind-set, defence culture and organisation: clearly, these elements are closely 
related to the factors ‘trust, confidence and solidarity’ and to ‘geography and 
history’. But even between neighbouring countries mind-sets, defence culture 
and organisation can demonstrate significant varieties. In Benesam, in the 
Franco-German Brigade and in the German-Netherlands land forces coopera-
tion these differences have not created major problems and neither does this 
seem to be the case in the Eurocorps or EATC. One should not forget that such 
military formations develop their own mind-set, culture and organisation over 
time – ’esprit de corps’ becomes an important factor in itself.
(9) Defence planning alignment: only the Benesam case study underscores the 
importance of this factor. The prolongation of the existing success – in parti- 
cular the task specialisation in training and the maintenance of minehunters 
(Belgium) and M-frigates (the Netherlands) is completely dependent on both 
countries procuring the same replacement ships which has now been planned 
in close coordination. This is a new growth area for clusters as the cooperation 
progresses into forms of integration. The deepest forms of defence cooperation 
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– with mutual dependencies – will change the priority in defence planning 
from ‘national first’ to ‘with partner(s) first’.
(10) Standardisation and interoperability: all examples show that common concepts 
and doctrine offer huge potential for increasing the usability of operational 
clusters. The same applies to education, training and exercises, even when 
subunits and combat support units are national formations. Once more, stan-
dardisation and interoperability can easily be realised when operating the 
same equipment. To a large extent, the success of the European participating 
Air Forces is the result of the four countries operating the same F16 fighter 
aircraft.
(11) Realism, clarity and the seriousness of intentions: the Eurocorps and the 
Franco-German Brigade have sometimes been labelled as ‘symbolic’ or 
‘window-dressing’. The realistic approach of the participating nations – tailor 
it to what it should do – and the clarity and seriousness of the intended coope- 
ration have resulted in two very usable cooperation models as shown by their 
track record of deployments. On the other hand, raising high and unrealistic 
expectations should be avoided. Political announcements on establishing a 
European Army have turned out to be empty shells. 
(12) Involvement of Parliaments: naturally, for operational deployment this factor 
only comes into play when a contributing country to a defence cooperation 
model is dependent on parliamentary approval – as is the case in Germany for 
crisis management operations. The Bundestag has not blocked deployments of 
the Franco-German Brigade, but this in itself does not prove the irrelevance of 
this factor. It is unlikely that the German Federal Government will bring a 
proposal for deployment to the Bundestag when it is known in advance that a 
supporting majority in Parliament will be lacking. In that sense the role of 
Parliament is important because of its pre-decision-making effect. 
Many other lessons can be learned from existing defence cooperation models. Some 
success factors – like trust, the top-down/bottom-up combination, the same mind-
-set and realism – apply to all of them. The importance of other factors may vary, 
depending on the characteristics of the model. Clearly, the importance of these key 
factors is higher for models with mutual dependencies or role/task specialisation, 
such as training and maintenance in Benesam. Success factors in some cases turn 
out to be failure factors in others. ‘The less, the better’ – i.e., referring to the number 
of participants – is true for the most complex combat capabilities, but is certainly 
not a golden rule for deeper defence cooperation in enablers, as the EATC case 
shows. The same applies to a factor like the size of the countries or their armed 
forces.
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Towards Specialised Clusters
The EU and NATO have grown in membership over the past decades, while at the 
same time the security environment has drastically changed. Europe is confronted 
by different security challenges to its East – a neonationalist Russia – and to its 
South where spill-over effects from the instability and turmoil in Africa and the 
Middle East are the dominant threats: migration, terrorism and transnational crime. 
Even in the digital age geography still matters. In Eastern Europe territorial defence 
against Russia’s military threats is the primary concern. It is reflected in the defence 
policies of the Allied countries in the region and in their defence budget allocation. 
The Baltic States and Poland will soon live up to the NATO two percent GDP 
defence expenditure target. These countries invest mainly in the modernisation of 
their land forces. Spain and Italy belong to the lowest performers in terms of the 
GDP percentage allocated to defence. Their navies are given priority as they pro-
vide key capabilities to protect the maritime borders in the Mediterranean. Western 
and Northern European countries have less outspoken priorities and often contri-
bute to NATO’s forward presence as well as to operations in the South. 
Another line of division between European countries is the willingness to parti- 
cipate in high-end interventions. France has intervened several times in Africa to 
stop advancing terrorist groups and to prevent states from collapsing. Only a 
handful of European partners have supported France militarily during these inter-
ventions and, if this were the case, mainly with enabling capabilities such as trans-
port aircraft. More European partners have contributed to follow-on UN or EU 
missions. With the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) France is aiming to create 
a ‘club’ of countries with comparable strategic interests, with the willingness to 
intervene and with capabilities at the high-end of the spectrum. Clearly, E2I would 
not get off the ground in the EU because of the unanimity rule. Apparently, so far 
France also wants to keep E2I outside PESCO. The UK has created the JEF as an 
expeditionary oriented formation which has become a selection tool for the contri-
butions of European partners that are willing ‘to go in first’. The CJEF with France 
fulfils the same purpose. Germany remains a difficult case. Since the early 1990s 
successive governments in Berlin have succeeded in creating more political and 
public support for German participation in crisis management operations. Yet, this 
took place under various sets of caveats and restrictions on the use of force. In 
German society there is still limited support for participation in high-end interven-
tion-type operations. For that reason the German political and military establish-
ment is now rather content with the focus on NATO’s Article 5 task of territo- 
rial defence. This has been the uncontested part of the German military build-up 
after the Second World War. The same applies today. Finally, there is a group of 
European countries – Austria and Ireland are outstanding examples – that are 
not willing or able to contribute to any high-end operation. However, they do con-
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tribute to stabilisation and capacity-building missions in more benign security cir-
cumstances.
This variety among European countries in their defence policy and defence posture 
orientation could perhaps also be applied to cluster selection. For example, expedi-
tionary-oriented nations, willing to contribute to high-end operations, should hook 
up with the military formations of France and the UK. With the JEF this is already 
the case. Countries whose main focus is on territorial defence and with a priority 
for strengthening their land forces could group around Germany (and Poland). 
Finally, those European nations which participate mainly in stabilisation-type mis-
sions could group around a core provided by Italy. Naturally, such ‘specialised 
clusters’ should not be developed in isolation from each other. EU and NATO 
overall coordination is required in order to ensure that the collective requirements 
are met for the type of operations they should be able to conduct. Furthermore, 
specialised clusters could reinforce each other: quickly deployable ‘first in’ capabi-
lities will be needed for NATO’s Article 5 for which the NRF and its spearhead have 
been designed; on the other hand, heavy territorial defence forces can also be used 
in crisis management operations as a back-up to stabilisation activities once the 
initial intervention has come to an end. One might argue that such specialisation is 
neither desirable – as it might split rather than unite the defence efforts of European 
countries – nor obtainable as it sets too high demands for defence cooperation 
between sovereign states. However, specialised clusters are already a reality. The 
JEF and the Franco-British CJEF are proof of this development. Germany is imple-
menting the so-called Bühler Plan – mentioned after the Planning Director in the 
German Armed Forces Staff – which is focusing Berlin’s defence planning up to 
2030 on the strengthening of a three Division strong, heavy armoured core of the 
land forces. Other nations can contribute with their specific capabilities in what is 
called the German Framework Nation Concept. It is incorporated in the NATO 
Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Several other countries continue to underline 
the importance of their national contributions to stabilisation and capacity-building 
missions. In other words: specialised clusters already exist; framing them all in an 
EU and NATO context is preferable to allowing them to develop without any coor-
dination7.
Conclusions
European defence is not just the business of the European Union and NATO. In 
fact, most far-reaching defence cooperation takes place in smaller bilateral or subre-
gional clusters. Some of them have a longer history, but many of them were created 
in recent times. It reflects a political trend to deepen military cooperation with good 
7 See Dick Zandee (2017). 
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neighbours instead of distant friends, but in many cases declining defence budgets 
also increased the pressure to maintain capabilities through close coordination 
with partner countries and even by integrating capabilities. The result is a complex 
pattern of defence clusters across Europe. The larger operational formations also 
reflect national strategic cultures, defence policies and military priorities. In broad 
terms: France and the United Kingdom provide the core for high-end intervention 
capabilities, Germany (and Poland) for heavy armoured follow-on land forces 
and Italy for border protection and stabilisation missions. Other countries hook up 
with the UK-led Joint Intervention Force or with the German Framework Nation 
Concept as they like. 
These defence clusters – initiated and developed outside the EU or NATO context 
– provide the real core of European defence cooperation. There is no European 
Army; there are in fact several European armies. Instead of pursuing the unobtai-
nable – a common European capacity for all kinds of military operations – the 
obtainable should be welcomed. European countries have started to specialise – 
one country more than the other – which is reflected in the various operational 
clusters. If the EU and NATO can build a well-coordinated and consistent overall 
framework around these clusters, Europe might be on its way to getting the mili-
tary capabilities which are needed for a better transatlantic burden-sharing as well 
as to underpin the responsibility to take care of its own security and defence.
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